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周波:“自由主義國際秩序”?這不過是一種歷史近視
以下為英文提要和采訪原文:
Geraldine Doogue :The man we're going to meet, Zhou Bo, who we spoke to and we got good feedback on him. He's a retired Senior Colonel. He has recently brought out a new book -- Should the world fear China? Now that's an unusual book to emerge from China.
Hamish Macdonald:Zhou Bo, welcome to Global Roaming now. Can we start with the current moment? To be honest, the thing I really, really want to know is the way China is viewing this moment. There's such chaos in the world, but how is that viewed from China?
Zhou Bo:Well, this is really a billion-dollar question. Actually, I myself have been struggling with this issue in part because I kind of dismiss the concept has been deep, deeply rooted, that is the so called “l(fā)iberal international order”. To put a long story short, basically, I believe the international order now as in the past, is the same thing. It is a combination of different countries, different social system, different national identities, different cultures, and, above all, different civilizations. So just give you an example, people basically know more or less how the world look like after 16th century with this so called geographical discovery -- De Gamma discovered india and Columbus discovered America. So people then developed that general idea about how the world looks like. But if you just say the world order is kind of liberal international order, that was basically a kind of historic myopia. Because if that is true, that is very much Francis Fukuyama’s world—the end of history.
Geraldine Doogue:So you are saying that this is sort of Western imposition, aren’t you?
Zhou Bo:Yes, the time after the dissolution of Soviet Union and before the full rise of China, that looks at best like the liberal international order. But if you believe in that, then you become narcissistic. And if you find that you are not strong enough, then you start to look for enemies. So that is something very bad. But if you believe this world order is a composition, is a hybrid of a different civilizations, then you would tell yourself, how can I coexist with other people.
Geraldine Doogue :In a way, President Trump almost might agree with you. He seems to be imagining some sort of shared power and influence which has caused a great deal of shock in, you know, in parts of the West, as he decides he's going to twin with people who certainly have had a very different view about the way powers are used. So, in a way, what you're describing, wouldn't you say slightly accords with his apparent view?
Zhou Bo:No, I don't think so. Because Trump's idea is to Make America Great Again. And this kind of Make America Great Again is basically to resume American hegemony, or dominance in the world, while China would consider itself a part of the world, no more than a pole.
Geraldine Doogue:Doesn't he want to divide up the world? Isn't that one of the things we're learning that he has these spheres of interest?
Hamish Macdonald:He's willing to give Europe to Russia. He's willing to give maybe the Asia region to China, and allow America to concentrate on its own.
Zhou Bo:Your description is probably right. But the point is, first of all, sphere of influence is really an old concept, a very old concept, which should not be fitting for the 21st century. I’m always arguing that China, first of all, doesn't have any spheres of influence. Even if China wants, China won't have sphere of influence. Why is that? Most people would describe Southeast Asia as China's backyard. But look at Southeast Asia, where we have quite a few countries that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, where there are quite a few countries that are American allies. In Northeast Asia, the DPRK won't necessarily listen to China. So where is your sphere of influence? So the conclusion is, if China doesn't have sphere of influence, then you don't need to establish it. You just go to the rest of the world to make yourself more influential. Influence and sphere influence are two different things. Because China's influence is already global, china doesn't need to seek sphere influence. If you seek sphere of influence, you have to have allies, which itself is costly and difficult to maintain. Why would you try to do that?
Geraldine Doogue:Very interesting. So you're putting the idea that there's absolutely nothing imperialistic at all about the way China is approaching international affairs, and that you have this very interesting diagnosis of China's temperament. At the moment, you say that it is still full of victimhood, which doesn't help China's growth. Now, why do you say it's not helpful to your own country's growth?
Zhou Bo:Yes. A lot of Chinese believe in this kind of victimhood. That is right, because China certainly was invaded after 1840. But if we talk about 100 years of humiliation, that even in theory, mathematically speaking, should finish by 1940 and People's Republic of China was established in 1949 when Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people have stood up. Then Chinese people have stood up. Then the century should have finished, right? This kind of victimhood actually wouldn’t help China, because it might lead to nationalism, because you feel that you are wrongly treated by other people. So if you become strong, then you may just make other people nervous. China is certainly a developing country, if its population is divided, if its economy strength is divided by its population. But then there is really a possibility that China could still become the largest economy in the world. So can the largest economy in the world be also a developing country? If yes, so, what is the point of dividing countries into developing country and developed country? If China becomes the strongest nation on this, how can you still have victimhood? Do you still describe yourself as victim?
Hamish Macdonald:Okay. But this is part of what America's complaint about China is, right? That you have leveraged the position of developing nation status to your own advantage. This is part of the whole argument against Western developed nations throwing money into the climate transition, because countries like China are classified as developing and therefore don't have the same impost in terms of responding. That scene is unfair, because, as you point out, you might become the biggest economy in the world.
Zhou Bo:The irony is that, because Chinese are wearing too many hats, all of them are true. So that confuses everybody including Chinese. We are the second largest economy by GDP, but we are the largest by PPP. Then China is certainly the largest trade nation on earth. China is the largest exporter. China is the largest industrial nation, but China, not a long time ago, is also the most populous country on earth.
Hamish Macdonald:So why is China afraid to admit its power and its might?
Zhou Bo:I think because there is a truth, a grain of truth in every aspect. China is wearing too many hats. So it depends on really who you are talking to, right? And it also depends on where you are standing if you look at China.
Hamish Macdonald:Respectfully, Zhou, I'm feeling a bit of that too many hats in listening to your explanations. Like you talk about China not really wanting or needing allies, but there is this no-limits partnership with Russia. How does that all fit together?
Zhou Bo:I'm glad you brought up this question, because -- let me just try to persuade you in the most simple way. If I say, for example, Hamish, I say I want to develop my friendship with you. And then let's hang on for a moment, Hamish, our friendship has to be limited. What do you think? So this kind of unlimited friendship is basically an expression of good wishes for this kind of friendship to go on.
Hamish Macdonald:But China is not saying that to all its friends. I mean, it does say friendships have limits. I mean, it said that to us here in Australia. We've gone through times of really building the friendship, and then there's been moments where China said, “No. You know, there are issues here.”
Zhou Bo:Maybe I can try to convince you another way. Although this friendship is described as unlimited in the same document where this very word was mentioned just one or two sentences after this, we have maintained that is not one of military alliance. So this war has demonstrate exactly how China, in spite of this friendship, has bottom lines. China has discouraged any use of nuclear weapons. China has not provided any missiles or military aid to Russia.
Hamish Macdonald:Yeah, this is, you know, something that I just don't understand, right? China does aspire to be a major global power. Why not exercise its influence in this relationship with Russia to bring about an end to a major conflict in Ukraine?
Zhou Bo:Well, that is because you are looking at this issue through the prism of a European. When China examines this relationship, first of all, China has to look at this relationship from bilateral basis. So the war…
Hamish Macdonald:But I'm also listening to what China is saying about the need for economic growth to rely upon peace, the need for stability on our planet to ensure ongoing prosperity.
Zhou Bo:Oh, of course. On stability, the question is, what cause instability? Because Russia would consider NATO’s expansion the very source of instability. And there is some truth in it, because – Putin, what makes him different from his predecessors? He's a man who said “enough is enough.” Because from the Soviet time, that is from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin, they all think in the same light, that is NATO should not expand. But Putin is a man who said “enough is enough”, and he decided to do something that is different between him and his predecessors.
Geraldine Doogue:I don't know that we're going to solve this difference of opinions on this podcast, but I would like to move to another, question you make the obvious point in your book. The biggest question facing us all is how war can be avoided between China and others, whoever those others may be. Well, your answer is pretty blunt, and it's a real challenge about China and Taiwan. Now, could you outline that please, so we can hear how somebody like yourself sees it?
Zhou Bo:Yeah. First of all, the chance of China having a war, even with the United States, is not inevitable. There are only two places where we might have the wars or conflicts: the first is South China Sea, the second is Taiwan Strait. I put South China Sea in front of the Taiwan Strait, contrary to what most people think, just because Americans keep on sending aircraft and ships to come to South China Sea, where we sometimes would do interceptions. Because this would create kind of a very dangerous close-distance encounters.
Hamish Macdonald:What's the problem with America sending ships and an aircraft to monitor freedom of navigation in the South China Sea? It's not Chinese territory.
Zhou Bo:Well, that's exactly the point. Chinese believe these islands and rocks are Chinese territories, while the United States would not, you know, agree to that. That is fine. But then the point is, the United States is not a country that has actually ratified the UN Convention Law of Sea, but it is behaving as if it is guardian of the Law of the Sea. Then my question is, if the law is so good, why don't you ratify it? If they're not good, why would you challenge other people in the name of it?
Geraldine Doogue:But look, I want to bring you back. I read in your introduction, “how can war be avoided in the Taiwan Straits? My answer is simple: let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible”. It's an extraordinary sentence from you. I might add, there was no mention of the Taiwanese people in that. What the Taiwanese people might like? How do we come to some sort of understanding about a move forward where everybody's rights are respected?
Zhou Bo:Well, I talked about that because that is my most simple answer to a billion-dollar question. Because, according to China's law, one of the conditions for China to use non-peaceful means is that Beijing felt that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted forever. Therefore we have to believe that, “okay, this kind of prospect for peaceful reunification is not exhausted, so we would have patience,” right? So China is growing with strength, and that invites a question: whether China would be more confident to have peaceful reunification, or China would become more impatient to use force?
My view is that we have to let Chinese government to believe that peace is still possible, and that would mean restraint from the United States. That means restraint from the Taiwanese authorities. So with all these, I believe peace is still possible. If the Chinese Government believe peaceful reunification is not possible, then, it’s a totally different story.
Hamish Macdonald:There are also many different ways that this could happen, right? So many people point to the Hong Kong example. There's many scenarios in which Taiwan could be taken back, isn't it?
Zhou Bo:Well, this kind of analogy is not absolutely all right. Let me give you another example. Before COVID, there was about 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland. So you just cannot imagine as if the two sides are all separated. No.
Hamish Macdonald:I'm interested in what you think China's role as a global power is moving forward. There's a lot of talk in China when you hear the communication of the outside world that refers to the international rules-based order. And we have an America that seems to be giving up on soft power, seems to be turning allies into enemies. What role does China play then, if America is not going to play that traditional role?Does China want to step in and be that player, or is it something else?
Zhou Bo:Let me tell you, if there are 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland China. That means 6% Taiwanese people were already living in mainland China. And people always mentioned how China would use sticks, but people forgot, China also has offered a lot, a lot of carrots. For example, the children of Taiwanese could actually go to kindergartens in Fujian province, like our children would do. They would have ID cards, almost same ID card. So those people, 1.5 million people, tell a lot. These people do not care to live in a totally different society with a totally different political system, so long as this society can provide them better opportunities. And these people, are middle-class people and above, right? So I believe with globalization, with the acceleration of AI, the integration between mainland China and Taiwan is also accelerating, like in any parts of the world. So that means maybe one day Taiwanese people would consider it's not that bad to be part of the strongest nation on earth.
Zhou Bo:China has already stepped in. Yeah, because when the rest of the world looks more chaotic, people definitely will look up to China to ask the same questions as you did. But then how would China look like? I think China would look more like a kind of anchor or stabilizer in this volatile world.
Hamish Macdonald:But wouldn't that involve playing the role of dealmaker when it comes to conflict in the Middle East or conflict in Europe? Wouldn't it actually involve doing something quite different to what China does on the global stage?
Zhou Bo:I believe China does have a role, both in the Middle East and in the war in Ukraine. Because right now Russia and the United States are talking but you read newspapers like I do, so actually, President Putin's offer of ceasefire is just conditional, right? So maybe there could be a time when all the major powers, including China, would have to provide a kind of collective security guarantee.
Hamish Macdonald:Can you see China doing that, for example, in Ukraine or in the Middle East?
Zhou Bo:Yeah, I think so, because it depends on how the situation develop. If the end game is a kind of armistice, then it needs security guarantee.
Hamish Macdonald:What would be the security guarantee that you could imagine? Let's just take Ukraine as the example.
Zhou Bo:For example, Russia has claimed the four oblasts as Russian territories, but Russia can hardly really have full control of the four oblasts, because Ukraine is wholly supported by Europe, at least, If not by America. So that means these four oblasts in the future could very much become like Afghanistan, where Ukrainians would behave like Mujahideens to have endless guerrilla warfare. That means Russia can never have full control of the four regions. So that means there could be a possibility of so-called armistice. Because many people talk about the ceasefire, armistice and another scenario, but armistice is the one that is talked the most.
Hamish Macdonald:So starting on who's China offering the security guarantee, to the Russians or the Ukrainians?
Zhou Bo:Well, it has to be a collective security to both sides, because they could not win over others. But both sides are afraid. What about the ceasefire is broken, for different reasons? It's not only that Ukraine is afraid. Russia is also afraid, at least of looking lonely. So that is why Russia would want, you know, countries from Global South that is China, India and Brazil, to be involved.
Geraldine Doogue:And you make the point in your book about how many peacekeepers that China actually plays a big role in peacekeeping operations around the world, which I must say, I wasn't quite aware of. Would China be happy to send peacekeepers to monitor the Ukraine armistice?
Zhou Bo:I think if there is a request from the warring parties, which is the first condition for peacekeeping, then I think China can do that because China is the largest troop contributing country out of P5 and in terms of China's credibility in peacekeeping, it is never doubted. So China, along with India, with some other Global South countries, would be most, most suitable for this role, plus some non-NATO countries from Europe. Because this anyway, is a war in the heartland of Europe. So European countries can still be involved, but they should not be any NATO countries, because for Russia, these countries will simply be wolves in sheep’’ clothing, I believe.
Geraldine Doogue:Maybe we should go back to the title of your book, Should the world fear China? Now, you're clearly saying, “No, it should not.” Develop that idea, particularly at the moment when everything is so fluid and no one quite knows how it's going to unfold in the next little while. Tell us why you think China, in fact, could play a constructive role in this new world order.
Zhou Bo:Well, let's look at China's history in the last 40 years. China's rise is already a miracle in human history. So this is already proved it. I think the next thing China needs to prove is that even if China is strong, it doesn't have to behave like a hegemon. That is the next challenge. I think China has already solved the first problem. We have to wait and see whether China can actually behave like the strongest nation on earth, but not a hegemon. That is challenging, but we have time to wait and see. But if China can achieve, you know, peace in the last 40 years and plus, why just can’t China make the world safer? The world is not how the West look at it. If you look at this world, in Global South, I think people's perception about China is more or less positive. In Africa, certainly, most of the countries would have positive views of China. Then in the Indo-Pacific, this picture is a little bit patchy, but even last year, China's impression in the Southeastern Asia actually prevails over people's impression of the United States according to a poll.
Geraldine Doogue:With India, can I just pop that in with India? It has been quite a lot more complicated.
Zhou Bo:Yes, that is true, because, India’s relationship with China was good, but until we had the deadly brawl in the border in 2020. But even in that incident, I still see something positive, that is neither side decides to shoot at each other. Isn't it strange that the two modern armies in the world were fighting in a Stone Age manner, so that means the soldiers on both sides know subconsciously that they should not shoot at each other.
Hamish Macdonald:We might be somewhat skimming over the feelings in parts of Africa and parts of the Pacific about the debt levels and the obligations that those countries have now to China because of the loans that were granted to them. I wonder, then, where that leaves us here in Australia, does China want to be our friend, or is it something a little more nuanced?
Zhou Bo:Let me tell you the first country that I visited was actually Australia in 1990. That was my first trip to Australia, working as an interpreter for Chinese pilot training on simulator of Ansett Australia, which does seem to exist anymore. But I was back in 1999 when I was the first visiting fellow of the Royal Military College in Duntroon, where I stay for three months. So I believe, generally speaking, Chinese People's feelings toward Australia is quite positive, because you are far away from us. You are a big island in the ocean. Theoretically you should not be enemy, but historically, you always fought other people's war.
Hamish Macdonald:Yes, we are far away. Why are Chinese naval ships circumnavigating Australia? What's the purpose of all of that? How do you want us to interpret that?
Zhou Bo:Well, maybe I should remind you why your ships would sail so close to Chinese shore? And why would your aircraft penetrate into the airspace of Paracel Islands, which, according to Chinese, is China's airspace? And you did it more than once for all these kinds of things, and the Chinese ships sailing…
Hamish Macdonald:I think our position, though, our formal position, is that we're ensuring that there's free passage through international trade routes. So there is a bit different.
Zhou Bo:Can I just borrow your words to say, we are doing exactly the same thing around Australia, for the same reason?
Hamish Macdonald:You want to send trade around the bottoms of Australia. Do you?
Zhou Bo:No. I mean, our ships are also doing kind of freedom navigation around Australia.
Hamish Macdonald:For what purpose?
Zhou Bo:Right. First of all, that is high seas we can sail. There's no international rule, you know, restricting that. And actually, the question is for you. Why would you sail through Taiwan strait? What is the purpose of you sailing through Taiwan strait? There is not much business for you to go through there, right? One third of your trade is done with China. The warships don't have to carry all these goods through Taiwan strait.
Hamish Macdonald:So the interpretation that you think we should take from this is, “don't do it to us.”
Zhou Bo:Well, I don't think the Chinese government has ever talked about like that, but the international law would allow us to do that. But if you ask yourself, do some soul-searching, I think it is good for you.
Hamish Macdonald:(laughter) Should we leave it there?
Geraldine Doogue:Oh, well, I just really wanted to ask you about hard and soft power. Joseph Nye talks about the fact that long-term soft power often wins over hard power. You know, there's the PLA equipped in an extraordinary way. You've got a navy that is the envy now of the world. But your soft power, I would argue, to you, is really not great. You're on the back foot despite those changes in the Global South, do you see this as a deficit for China?
Zhou Bo:I don't think so, because it really depends on how you define soft power. Let me just raise the PLA you have mentioned. So far PLA’s operation overseas are all communitarian in nature, be it counterpiracy, peacekeeping or disaster relief. And our hospital ship, Peace Ark, has been sailing around the world to give free medicine and free medical treatment to people without charging anything. And this is the Chinese efforts to show that its intentions are benign. My hope as a PLA veteran is that I hope PLA will always do humanitarian operation in the future, even if China has the largest number of ships. Because you don't have to kill people with all kinds of excuses whatsoever. Who can remember all these excuses? But if you just do humanitarian aid to people of the rest of the world, people would be grateful to you. And who can disagree the importance of peacekeeping, counterpiracy and disaster relief?And this is exactly what PLA has been doing. You cannot give me a single example that the PLA has killed anyone overseas in the last 40 years. Isn't that impressive?
Hamish Macdonald:Zhou, we come from two countries that often don't understand each other very well, and often don't talk directly to each other very much. So personally, I want to say thank you for coming on and discussing with us. And I actually hope that we can have you back and continue this conversation. I think it's as important as ever.
Zhou Bo:Thank you, Hamish and Geraldine. This is an interesting friendly quarrel.
Geraldine Doogue:[Chuckles] Friendly quarrel, we may need more friendly quarrels.
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